Collective action and UK wine investment fraud by Einarsen, Karina & Jack, Lisa
1 
 
Collective action and UK wine investment fraud  
Karina Einarsen 
Lisa Jack* 
Accounting and Financial Management Group, Business and Finance Faculty, University 
of Portsmouth, Richmond Building, Portland Street, Portsmouth PO1 3DE UK 
*Corresponding author: lisa.jack@port.ac.uk 
ABSTRACT 
Purpose 
The purpose of this research note is to examine the measures taken by legitimate wine 
investment companies and enforcement agencies to counter alternative investment scams.  
Design 
We interviewed wine industry and law enforcement specialists to understand the nature of wine 
investment fraud and the characteristics of the victims. We also drew on secondary data in the 
form of government agency research and media sources. 
Findings 
The majority of wine investment frauds are boiler room operations, using social engineering 
techniques to draw victims into the fraud. We conclude that countering wine investment fraud 
requires public education by government, the wine industry and the police.  
Research Limitations 
This is a small-scale study that uses interviews with experts in the industry and in law 
enforcement, and secondary data as evidence. Despite the limitations in the number of 
interviews, we are able to comment on the social impacts of alternative investment scams and to 
suggest a theoretical basis for future work in the field. 
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Originality 
We outline how collective action theory might be extended to investigate fraud prevention 
measures in other financial and commodity markets. 
Keywords: wine commodity investment, fraud, elder abuse 
Paper Classification: Research Paper  
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Collective action and UK wine investment fraud 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The UK's wine market is the sixth largest in the world, with an estimated overall consumption of 
133.8 million nine-litre cases per year (Tisi, 2015). Action Fraud, the official UK national 
reporting centre for fraud and cybercrime, estimates that annually in the UK around £1.2billion is 
lost in scams involving wine and similar alternative commodity investment frauds, with victims 
involved losing an average of £20,000 each (Graham, 2016). In August 2017, police arrested 
three men suspected of wine investment fraud in the UK, and early reports of this case suggested 
that 39 people lost approximately £1million between them (Binkiewicz, 2017). In North 
America, frauds include that of Premier Cru, a wine investment company in the US, which sold 
futures contracts for French wine. This is suspected to have been the largest ever Ponzi scheme 
in the fine wine sector (Frank, 2016), with the company reported to be $70 million in debt, 
though having only $7 million in assets in liquidation (ibid.).  
 
We address the issue of professional and public education for this type of fraud. Since 2016, 
when this study was conducted several legitimate wine firms have started to provide webpages 
alerting the public to the nature of their business and how to spot fraudulent offerings. They have 
been encouraged in this by the UK Wine and Spirits Trade Association (WSTA), and some of 
the findings of this project contribute to WSTA publications. There have also been separate 
public information consumer programmes on, for example, the BBC. Our study provides 
evidence to show why this collective action has taken place and the contemporary aspects of 
wine investment fraud that prompted action. We argue that this activity in fraud prevention 
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follows incidents in which vulnerable individuals became involved in investment frauds 
previously thought to involve only knowledgeable individuals who understood the risks. For 
instance, elder financial abuse is a growing concern for many governments as it targets a 
vulnerable group (Malks et al., 2008). We outline how collective action theory, drawn from a 
micro-sociological perspective on social movements, can help to understand why these counter 
fraud protections are adopted. 
 
This is a small-scale, qualitative study based on interviews with experts who based on their 
experience provide a wide-ranging overview. This includes issues faced by the legitimate wine 
industry and by enforcement agencies in dealing with those who report being defrauded and with 
the prosecution of known frauds.  
 
In this study, we (1) examine who commit wine investment fraud, and how they operate; (2) 
categorise potential personality traits targeted by fraudsters. This enables us to evaluate, through 
the lens of collective action, the counter fraud mechanisms put in place by the wine industry and 
police, and what lessons arise from other forms of financial crime prevention. As corruption is 
being tackled internationally as a collective action problem (United Nations Global Compact, 
2015), we suggest that public protection against other forms of financial and commodity market 
fraud could be investigated as social and collective action. Because this is a research note rather 
than a full, empirical research paper, we conclude by suggesting further research that can be 
developed from this study.  
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BACKGROUND 
According to Anderson, Neglen and Pinilla (2017) in 2014-16, the UK had the world’s 10th 
highest volume of wine consumption per capita (p.5) and the fourth highest share of the world’s 
wine consumption expenditure in 2015 (p.6). It is second in terms of the percentage share of 
world wine import value for 2014-16 and third in terms of the percentage share of import volume 
(p.14). As a producer, the UK wine industry is negligible in world trade but imports in fine wines 
has been evident in Britain since the seventeenth century. All of this contributes to a discourse 
that the British understand wine. 
 
A sense that wine is a good investment is not misplaced. A 2012 survey found that 28% of high 
net worth individuals have a wine collection, and that 2% of their wealth is tied up in wine 
(Barclays, 2012 cited in Dimson, Rousseau and Spaenjers (2015)). According to Dimson, Marsh 
and Staunton (2018), whilst equities and not housing provide the best long-term investment, with 
an average return since 1899 of 5.2% based on a world-wide portfolio, wine investments provide 
the second highest return at 3.7%.  
 
Two other factors contribute to the growth of wine investment fraud in the current environment 
in the UK. First, there has been a well-document period of austerity following the financial crises 
of c. 2008. The negative effects of financial stress on markets transmitted from one market to 
another (for example, the US to the Eurozone) are well documented by Evgenidis and Tsagkanos 
(2017) and Tsagkanos, Evgenidis and Vartholomatou (2018). Second, in 2015, the British 
Government allowed pension freedoms that allowed the newly retired to draw down lump sums 
of cash rather than the previous obligation to invest pension amounts into annuities. Her 
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Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) reported in 2017 that over 1.5 million payments were 
made using pension freedoms, with 162,000 people accessing £1.56 billion in just under 3 
months at the end of 2016 (HM Treasury, 2017). 
 
Wine investment has increased since 2005, possibly because investors are looking for alternative 
investments to avoid stock market fluctuations (Mannan, 2013; Holmberg, 2010), including 
those with money to invest as a result of pension freedoms. Wine investment can be defined as 
´the acquisition of wine for gain, whether as a means for making money or financing 
consumption or a combination of the two` (Robinson and Harding, 2015, p. 375). The price of 
high quality wine usually stabilises after some decades and rises when it becomes antiquei 
(Dimson et al., 2015).ii Legal wine investment is similar to investments in precious stones or art 
(ibid.), but certain investment cases, some involving wine experts such as Spyros Constantinos 
(Budd, 2015), Loïc Pasquet (Anson, 2016), Rudy Kurniawan (Mercer, 2015) and Daniel Snelling 
(Budd, 2013) show that this type of fine wine investment is subject to fraud.  
 
There is a tradition of deceit in wine selling (Daab, 2011). Manipulation involves the bottle and 
its design being forged, or the wine itself being mixed or ‘stretched’, with the intention to sell it 
as a more expensive wine. Lecat et al. (2017, p. 84) provide an inventory of forgery techniques 
employed in France, noting that: 
 
As the traceability of great wines is becoming crucial, a new type of relationships [sic] 
between producers anxious to offer genuine estate wines and consumers anxious to drink 
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the bottles they ordered has developed. This new constraint became a marketing 
opportunity for producers.  
 
Forgery techniques in Lecat et eal (2007) include usurpation of brand identity/awareness, for 
example by taking the name, design or symbols from a premium brand and applying it to an 
inferior one. The use of very similar bottles and labels (rather than forged ones) are also used to 
‘pass off’ wines. Another technique is to acquire empty bottles from a premium brand and refill 
them with a lessor or counterfeit wine. Some restaurants have apparently been known to smash 
finished bottles to prevent this fraud. Nauth (1977, translated by Holmberg, 2010) earlier also 
identified chain of bills frauds, where a shipment of low-quality wine is bought by (1), who pays 
cash, and resells it to (2), for a little more than it is worth. (2) increases the price a little more 
when reselling it to (3). (3) places it on the market for everyone to buy. All three are party to the 
fraud, as they are aware that the wines is being passed off. However, the stage enhancement in 
quality and price, makes investigating the fraud more complicated. 
 
Counterfeiting incidents have made vintners more protective of their newly produced wine. They 
add specific markings or other characteristics to the bottle to make it difficult to copy, although 
this only affects contemporary wines, not investment in old wine (Daab, 2011).   
 
Wine investment fraud is different to the manipulation of wine products. There is no ´typical 
fraud`, and a variety of methods and inducements are used (Langenderfer and Shimp, 2001). 
Legitimate direct investment in wine involves purchase of bottles of wine in either primary or 
secondary markets (Aytaç et al., 2016). The primary market involves purchase of bottles directly 
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from wineries “en primeur” – before it is bottled and released onto the market, and investors look 
to lock-in the price of wine prior to bottling (Coffman and Nance, 2009). Secondary market 
investments involve purchase of wine bottles through auctions or known wine merchants (Aytaç 
et al., 2016). Bottles are registered and stored in bonded warehouses until sold. Indirect 
investment in wine are achieved through wine investment funds, where, like traditional mutual 
funds, each fund has a different portfolio, containing several types of wines, in which one can 
invest (Aytaç et al., 2016). This create the perfect scenario for fraudsters as they can claim 
payments up front. The wine bottles are not expected to be physically delivered to the investors 
and it can take years before the fraud is discovered (Wall, 2011). The industry is also highly 
vulnerable to Ponzi schemes, as there are no dividends or other expected regular returns: 
investors are simply waiting for the wine to increase in value (Ganesh, 2016). 
 
Investment fraud may be defined as ´any fraud that is related to stocks, bonds, commodities, 
limited partnerships, real estate, or other types of investments`, often built upon deceitful 
promises and agreements, where targets are persuaded or coerced into making an investment 
(Albrecht et al., 2014, p. 557). The FBI (2018) lists 23 “common fraud schemes” on their 
website, of which some could be utilised for wine investment fraud, including advance fee 
schemes, internet action fraud, internet fraud, investment fraud, Ponzi schemes and telemarketing 
fraud (boiler room fraud).  
 
Social engineering can be defined as the “exploitation of humans in order to gain unauthorised 
access to sensitive information” (Mouton et al., 2014, p. 266).  It can exploit psychological 
biases and limitations. For instance, an individual may base his/her investment choices on a ´gut 
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feeling` about the person they are talking to, or the nature of the offer, and overlook the risk that 
they may lose their investment. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1973), this gut feeling, or 
intuitive prediction, is based on a heuristic termed representativeness. A decision is grounded on 
what is to the victim most representative of a good investment from the evidence at hand. If 
individuals’ heuristic measurements are based on non-relevant stored information, they can be 
misled in judging the legitimacy of investment opportunities. The optimal decision-making 
needed may exceed the investor's processing capabilities, and therefore available heuristics are 
the quickest solution (Bosley et al., 2018; Payne et al., 1988). Humans are adaptive and their 
actions and behaviour is malleable (Simon, 1990), thus, some might be victimised due to the 
manipulation of their gut feeling, whilst others might fall victim due to other factors, such as a 
propensity to take risks (Van Wyk and Benson, 1997). 
 
Fraudsters violate trust, often avoid confrontations, and are not necessarily prohibited by national 
borders due to technological devices (Shover et al., 2003). A common method for wine 
investment fraud is boiler room cold-calling (Button et al., 2014; Mannan, 2013; Levi, 2008; 
Stevenson, 1998). There is rather little literature on the victims of investment fraud and on 
victims of financial crime in general. Button et al. (2014) offer an in-depth study interviewing 
UK victims of fraud, which challenges the perception that fraud is victimless. In many cases, 
victims and families are financially, mentally and physically damaged for years after the crime. 
The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in the UK investigated victim profiles in cases of 
investment fraud, including alternative investment frauds involving fine wines. Graham (2014), 
who conducted the quantitative study in that FCA project, found that the most likely victims are 
the ‘retired with resources’ and the ‘mature and savvy’. However, Harvey et al. (2014), who 
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carried out the qualitative partner study for the FCA, found that there were an increasing number 
of victims who had acquired resources in retirement who were not at all ‘savvy’ in terms of 
investment, losing significant sums (an average of £20,000) to investment fraudsters. 
 
Growing concern about elder abuse involving finance is evident in several countries and grew 
into a significant discourse in the UK from around 2015, although concerns have been raised for 
many years (van Bavel et al., 2010; Malks et al., 2008). The Securities and Exchange 
Commission in the US has issued several initiatives (see for example Fleming, 2015) and the 
Department of Justice commissioned the Elder Abuse Guide for Law Enforcement (EAGLE)iii. 
Here, financial elder abuse is explained as “using an older adult´s money or assets (pension, 
home, social security checks), contrary to their wishes, needs or best interests, or for the abuser´s 
personal gain”iv. Further, the FCA (2016) informs that more than 25% of those over 55 years old 
in the UK are defrauded by an unauthorized firm selling unregulated products such as wine. 
 
Conceptual framework 
 
Rather than model the processes at play in the fraud, we are interested in the what would 
mobilise different social actors to engage in collective action to prevent the fraud. The 
motivation to look at this is grounded in the fact that the UN and others are applying the 
principles of collective action theory to tackle issues of corruption across the world (United 
Nations Global Compact, 2014). They suggest that by mobilising industry, enforcement agencies 
and civil and regulatory bodies to work together, corruption might be eradicated, or at least 
contained, in those countries most affected. This study shows a movement towards collective 
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action to tackle the issue of wine investment fraud, which appears to have been stimulated by the 
need to prevent elder abuse. Whilst the problem exists in many countries, the UK’s response 
appears to be the most developed within this industry. 
 
Collective action concerns the motivation of different groups and individuals to work together to 
enhance their status and achieve a common objective. Collective action theory has two strands. 
The first is a rational choice, game theory approach with roots in institutional economics, derived 
from the work of Mancur Olson (1965). Researchers are primarily concerned with ascertaining 
optimal group sizes to achieve outcomes in the form of public goods, and with the problem of 
free riding on the actions of others. Ostrom (2009, p. 195) notes that ‘many theorists interested in 
collective action focus on the potential positive effects of participants adopting simple heuristics 
to use when they are in a social dilemma situation’ and on the norms that groups develop to 
address situations. The second, more sociological strand looks at the micro-level origins of social 
movements and more contentious collective actions, such as terrorism (Oberschall, 2004; Pinard, 
2011). Such work tends to be transdisciplinary, drawing on, for example, psychology, 
anthropology and politics. There are several conceptual frameworks and qualitative 
methodologies available, but we focus on frameworks that identify people’s motivations for 
engaging in collective action.  
 
Oberschall (2004) identified four dimensions of collective action to explain motivation to engage 
in terrorism, although the model was developed for more benign social movements. The four 
dimensions are discontent, ideology-feeding grievances, capacity to organise, and political 
opportunity. Similarly, Van Zomeren et al. (2008) use injustice, efficacy and social identity 
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Pinard (2011) takes the analysis further and finds that discontent and injustice are insufficient as 
descriptors of motivation. Whilst some form of grievance may act as a catalyst, aspiration and 
moral obligation also provide impetus to collective action. Pinard (2011) then examines 
collective incentives and collective identity as necessary elements, whilst also examining 
capacity and political expediency. In the discussion section of this paper, an outline of how the 
four dimensions might apply to collective action against wine investment fraud is provided. 
Given the limitations in the data, the analysis is constrained, but it does indicate that there is 
scope for theories of collective action to be applied beyond the study of the prevention of 
corruption in financial crime. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
The research design is based on semi-structured interviews, using purposive sampling. Various 
specialists and professionals, either directly or indirectly linked to the wine industry in Europe, 
were identified through discussions with a representative of the UK WSTA. The overall number 
of potential expert interviewees is small – around 20 individuals in the UK – and our sample has 
seven experts. Whilst Marshall et al. (2013) recommend a minimum sample size of 15 interviews 
for a full study, Crouch and McKenzie (2006) and Bogner et al. (2014) recognise that for 
smaller, more reflective studies involving experts, even smaller samples might be acceptable, 
depending on the nature of the data being obtained. Each participant was accepted with diversity 
of experience and points of view in mind (see Table 3).  
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The interviews were recorded using a digital audio recorder, which produced about 11 hours (see 
Table 1) of recordings. The interviews were transcribed by the researchers, anonymised and 
stored securely.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
Subjects applied their experiences to broader social contexts and reflected upon aspects of the 
“reality” of the industry, and its limitations (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Then a thematic analysis 
of the interviews was undertaken. After close reading of the transcripts, the themes and codes 
were analysed using the following scheme. These themes emerged in part from the semi-
structured interview design developed from the literature, and in part from identifying patterns in 
the responses of the interviewees when they expanded on their experiences in encountering 
victims of such fraud: 
 
1. Development of wine investment fraud.  
- Why wine? 
- Counterfeit wine versus overpriced or non-existent wine. 
 
2. Wine investment fraud strategy. 
- Cold-calling. 
 
3. Characteristics of (wine investment) fraudsters. 
- Social engineering. 
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4. Characteristics of victims.  
- Lack of due-diligence. 
- Lack of knowledge about the trade (wine investment). 
 
5. Prosecution Process.  
- Misrepresentation. 
- Rip & tear. 
 
6. Unregulated versus regulated wine market.  
 
7. How is the industry affected by wine investment fraud? 
 
8. Mitigating wine investment fraud. 
 
The different data extracts have been cross-analysed to identify relational patterns, to produce the 
clearest thematic analysis possible. The coding identifying the themes has been conducted from a 
“top down” approach, compared to the more data driven inductive approach (Braun and Clarke, 
2006). Some of the identified themes are descriptive (semantic), mainly focusing on the “what” 
and “how”, while others are broader themes (latent), considering the “why”. 
 
A constraint was a restriction of ethical approval based on the inexperience of the main 
interviewers: they were not granted permission to carry out interviews with victims or convicted 
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persons that might have been useful to provide a more complete analysis However, an 
experienced researcher worked with the interviewers to ensure that the analysis was performed 
robustly. Despite this, the project has value because of the expertise of the informants (Bogner et 
al., 2009) and the fact that we could draw on high value secondary data in the form of empirical 
research studies with victims of investment frauds, and on reputable media sources, such as 
Harvey et al. (2014) and Graham (2014). Finally, the ability to triangulate our qualitative 
findings against a conceptual framework of collective action, provides some preliminary level of 
confidence and validity in our conclusions. 
 
FINDINGS 
 
We grouped our findings into four overarching themes: the nature of prevalence of wine 
investment fraud in the UK, the type of fraudster involved and how they operate, the nature of 
the victims (from the perspective of our expert interviewees), and the response of the industry. 
 
The nature and prevalence of wine investment fraud in the UK in 2016 
Some of the interviewees commented that wine investment fraud has increased in recent years 
and INT.C offered this explanation: 
 
“…when the price of Bordeaux went up significantly circa 2005, and 
the En Primeur…combined with China as a significant 
market…coupled with the financial crisis of 2008 when people were 
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looking for an alternative investment, it has sincerely been a 
significant growth since that”. 
 
The interviewees emphasised throughout that wine investment fraud does not necessarily differ 
in operation from other types of alternative investment frauds, for example in diamonds or 
carbon credit. However, it is an easier proposition for victims to identify with wine as an 
investment. As INT.C points out: 
 
“Wine at the high end has a sexy image: Bordeaux, Chateau, does 
have a sexy, luxurious image to it, and that is part of its attraction”.  
 
More specifically, INT.E said that:  
 
“Traditional wine investment tends to happen, you buy En Primeur, 
the wine comes in, you get small movements, incremental movements, 
over a very long period, with the idea that after twenty years, you 
bought two cases, and you are going to sell one, and that one has paid 
for the first case”. 
 
Any other type of investment in wine being offered is likely to be fraudulent, in their view. The 
main problems were perceived to involve counterfeit wines, and over-priced or non-existent 
wines. The latter are most prevalent in boiler room frauds. As INT.C explains: 
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“On the whole, people getting caught up in [counterfeiting] are 
wealthy wine lovers, who go to auctions, [and I suspect]… are highly 
unlikely to fall for investment scams, the type that I am talking 
about…The wine investment [fraud] I´m talking about is largely 
someone phoning you up and saying look I can offer you this case of 
Lafitte, that is going to make a profit”. 
 
In practice, these fraudsters would find it difficult to deal in actual bottles of wine. To get 
counterfeit or other bottles into a bonded warehouse (where many legitimate investment wines 
are stored), they would encounter background checks and exhaustive authentication processes. 
 
Cold calling method 
 
INT.C explained the attraction of cold calling to fraudsters:  
 
“It’s easier to get your brokers to phone up people. Why would you go 
through the trouble of counterfeiting…making your counterfeits look 
pretty genuine. Why bother...Sell these cases at twice the market 
value. Much easier. Either selling non-existent wine or selling existent 
wine at exaggerated prices with exaggerated promises”.  
 
Overall, the interviewees collectively identified four main strategies: 
 Selling non-existent wine as investment 
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 Selling wine investments at inflated prices 
 Selling wine at low prices and charging high trader commissions 
 Luring people to sell their wine, making them deliver wine prior to payment, then 
failing to pay. 
 
 
 
 INT.A explained that:  
 
“…They're virtually all the same...classic boiler room methods of 
selling, very high pressure sales techniques are employed by very well 
trained salespeople, which…usually rely on cold-calling…and they 
work by calling on people´s greedy nature I suppose…If you’re naïve 
enough you fall into the trap of seeing the money, and not seeing that 
something is too good to be true”.  
 
INT.D offered a description of other strategies: 
  
“…Another example is to sell the customer a fair price but to charge 
them a very high commission for their service, that after all the trades 
the capital gained has been eroded by the commissions. Another 
strategy is where people with wine are contacted and are offered very 
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high rates for the wine, get the wine delivered but never really pay for 
the wine that was delivered to them”. 
 
 
Most argued that the strategy has not developed much over time; the fraudsters have lists, an 
office operation, and people cold-calling. A front may be added to the fraud, through credible 
looking websites and brochures, a registered office within the ‘square mile’ in London, and a 
false name that may resemble legitimate company names (Forward, 2015). 
 
The interviewees stated clearly that legitimate wine investment companies do not need to cold-
call customers, as customers approach them. However, they do send offers to people who have 
signed up for their newsletter, or telephone them if they are a member of their services. From a 
wine broker’s point of view: 
 
“We don’t cold-call…That’s why we work hard on our reputation and 
branding…These fraudsters usually cold-call people who are not 
generally wine buyers and do not have any product knowledge around 
wine”. (INT.E) 
 
Characteristics of fraudsters in wine investment 
Other interviewees felt that there were wine investment fraudsters with a particular interest in 
wine, although INT.C argued: 
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“…they are first and foremost fraudsters, rather than wine 
investment fraudsters”.  
 
INT.A claims that those running the frauds look for specific types of people to perpetrate them. 
The recruits are highly focused on earning money quickly, being enticed into this lifestyle, which 
can only be supported by a certain income:  
 
“I think they are extraordinarily good salespeople. There’s no doubt 
that they´re sales trained, you know the people who do this properly, 
say for a living, the people who make a lot of money out of this, take a 
huge amount of care to train their staff, and they are brutal in terms of 
the people they will or won't accept...”. 
 
Summed up, the interviewees described the fraudsters as being intelligent, getting a buzz out of 
the trickery, and believing the story they sell. They also perceived fraudsters as having a high 
level of criminal intent, low ethical sensibility, and an ability to put their desire to earn ahead of 
the losses of the victims. Several interviewees felt that the fraudsters were above all 
‘extraordinarily good sales people’, and the INT.F1 and INT.F2 found them to be pleasant and 
empathic. INT.C stated: 
 
“A fraudster who is good at their job would seek to build empathy 
with the person they are defrauding…Seeking to persuade you [that] 
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“wine is a safe harbour, not affected by economic trends” et cetera. 
Which of course is nonsense”.  
 
According to the investigators interviewed, a central element of social engineering is knowing 
your victim and ´playing the right cards`. The fraudsters are skilled at social engineering and 
their skills are polished through practice as cold-callers. When asked particularly about the 
method used, INT.A explains that there is a definite pattern: 
 
“…high-pressure sales techniques that involve cold calling and then 
repeated calling thereafter. They bamboozle the customers with 
extraordinary facts, which may not be true and the victims do not see 
that some of these facts are too good to be true”. 
 
Boiler room fraud has another attraction for scammers: it is easy to move location, as all the 
fraudster needs is a telephone. INT.A commented:  
 
“…When not arrested...they set themselves up with a new 
environment, new serviced office, somewhere in the same area…It is 
extremely hard for the authorities to curtail it…”. 
 
The victims of wine investment fraud 
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When talking about victims of wine investment fraud, interviewees mentioned lack of awareness 
and lack of due diligence prior to the investment. They suggest that targets may be elderly and/or 
suffer from disabilities, creating a more complex social problem. 
 
INT.F2:  
“…Some of the elderly are that lonely that they are happy to speak to 
these people on the telephone...”. 
 
The cold-callers allegedly also target those with reduced mental capacity, as suggested in the 
statement of INT.C: 
 
“…unfortunately there is a number of instances where the person has 
dementia or Alzheimer’s. And that is played on by the broker's or the 
company…I think quite often people label these [victims] as being 
greedy. I´m not convinced that that is entirely fair. I think it can be fair 
if somebody is a sophisticated investor and has full control over his 
mental faculties…”.  
 
However, INT.A argues that anyone can fall victim to these scams: 
 
“I had a guy phone up who…worked in high profile banking, all his 
life…He put a quarter of a million pounds into this wine investment 
company who gone, just disappeared, with his money…A week later, 
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I had a phone call…And he was a former head within a UK Police 
department…He´d taken out a lump sum of the pension, and he put 
half of it into this investment company, who got him really excited, 
and he said, ´I can’t believe I've done it` “.   
 
Several interviewees raised the issue that the elderly and those with mental disabilities may not 
be able to carry out due diligence, whilst other victims had not carried out such precaution and 
fell victim to the fraudsters’ social engineering skills. Greed and a penchant for risk-taking may 
also be factors. All those interviewed were strongly of the opinion that victims of this type of 
fraud do not have knowledge about wine investment. 
 
Based on both primary and secondary information, this study identifies three main types of 
victims summarised in Table 3. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
This study found that there are several reasons why people fall victim to wine investment fraud, 
and the impression is that the fraudster knows how to exploit their weaknesses. The main 
exploitable traits found were: general human error, mental challenges, lack of knowledge about 
the trade and due diligence, trust, loneliness, greed, risk-seeking and wealth. 
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There is secondary data about the victims of investment fraud from the UK in the form of a two 
stage research carried out by and on behalf of the FCA, which regulates banking and investment 
activity. This is one of the very few studies to examine the victims of alternative investment 
fraud rather than the fraudsters (Harvey et al., 2014; Graham, 2014). The aim of the FCA 
through the project is to disrupt investment fraud at an earlier stage than tends to happen at 
present, as “the FCA receives 5,000 calls a year about suspected investment frauds. 20% of the 
investors had already paid money to fraudsters; it takes an average of four calls before people 
contact the FCA” (Graham, 2014, p. 2). The quantitative study carried out by the FCA (Graham, 
2014) looked at victim profiles in over 11,000 cases of investment fraud, including fine wine 
fraud, and found that “victims tended to be wealthy, financially sophisticated males, with an 
escalating correlation to older ages. There was particularly strong representation from residents 
of the South or East of England, and from either very urban or very rural locations.” (ibid.) This 
was particularly the case for boiler room frauds. They fit with the ‘elderly’ category that we 
identified. The report identifies that younger persons with fewer resources are more likely to fall 
for ‘get rich quick’ scams labelled as ‘other investment frauds’ but it is not clear that this means 
wine investment fraud, which is most commonly a boiler room fraud. However, the profile of 
younger victims  would fit into the ‘other’ category here. 
 
The qualitative study by Harvey et al. (2014) included a sample of 31 victims, the majority of 
whom were male and over the age of 50. Seven were victims of alternative investment fraud. The 
case studies and victim stories confirm our interviewees’ comments about how the fraudsters 
operate using social engineering techniques. However, elderly victims with mental health issues 
were not included. It is surprising that that our commentators appear to have been touched by the 
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crimes on the vulnerable elderly, through dealing with these victims first hand, or having had the 
stories related to them. They may also feel empathy for the elderly who have resources from 
retirement perhaps but are not otherwise particularly affluent. Harvey et al. (2014) found that 
many of their interviewees were new to investing, having acquired a substantial sum of money 
(by their living standards) through retirement, inheritance, sale of a business or insurance. It is 
not too difficult for fraudsters to identify and target the bereaved, retired or recipients of a 
financial gain. What is interesting is whether the outrage or empathy expressed by our 
interviewees in the wine industry and enforcement agencies would be sufficient to motivate 
action on behalf of the wine industry, as well as the police and FCA. 
 
Tackling the problem 
In 2016 when the data was collected, there was a reluctance among the legitimate wine 
investment businesses to get involved with prevention of wine investment frauds. They were 
clear that they were operating legitimately, and with knowledgeable investors. Despite awareness 
and knowledge of wine investment fraud, they felt it was the job of the police and other 
enforcement agencies to deal with the problem. They felt that their clients would not be exposed 
to the fraud because 
 
“It is rare for somebody to fall victim, who knows about…or buys fine 
wine. All too often it is somebody who knows very little about wine, 
they might buy wine from the supermarket…They are playing on 
people being ignorant, or not very knowledgeable, about the product 
they are being persuaded into invest in” (INT.C).  
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This argument is expanded on by INT.E who states: 
 
“First of all, wine investment is not suitable for most people…Second 
of all, because it is so illiquid, it´s not a good investment tool. You 
have to…not only know the price you should be paying, and by that 
you should be calling around all the merchants, you should also know 
what’s the supply of that wine, what’s the distribution of that 
wine…Wine investment is not suitable for people who do not know 
wine at this level”.  
 
He illustrates this point by comparing wine investment to investing in horses. Wine is something 
people feel that they know about, as they might drink it every week:  
 
“…Just because you’re riding a horse doesn’t mean you know how to 
invest in a horse, and if you're drinking wine, you may not know how 
you should invest in wine…So it is a lack of knowledge”.  
 
There were divided opinions about the extent to which it is easy for the public to access 
sufficient information to be able to understand wine investment. Some gave websites such as 
winesearcher.com and the well-known merchants’ websites as examples of information including 
prices that are accessible to everyone. However, that does not necessarily make wine investment 
understandable INT.E argues:  
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“I can tell you pricing. But what will that show? Doesn´t show you 
what the demand is. Doesn’t show you what the supply is. You can get 
the supply, but you don´t know how it´s been distributed, which has a 
huge effect on any of the supply at any given time”.  
 
This study identifies four enablers of fraudulent activity within the UK wine 
industry: 
 The wine industry is not affected by the fraud, other than in a purely 
reputational manner, and possibly by loss of sale. 
 The industry is an unregulated industry, running in a free market in the 
UK. 
 It is a traditional industry, which to some extent is built on trust and 
relationships. 
 Wine as an investment product will often stay in bonded warehouses 
 
However, since we completed the study, several of these firms have now issued advice against 
wine investment frauds on their websites (see for example, Majestic Wine PLC)v, and appear to 
be more actively engaged in public education, alongside their trade association and the 
enforcement agencies.  
 
DISCUSSION 
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The findings show that the perceptions of a sample of industry stakeholders are that the majority 
of wine investment frauds are boiler room operations that use cold-calling and tactics associated 
with social engineering. These are manipulative situations in which the fraudster demonstrates 
that they can meet their targets’ needs for investment. Interviewees also gave evidence of what is 
termed ´continuous social engineering`, where the scam extends beyond calling to the use of, for 
instance, free wine, and a legitimate-looking website.  
 
Those interviewees who work within the wine industry argued that they are not affected by 
frauds other than in a purely reputational manner, and from potential loss of sales. The wine 
industry is an unregulated industryvi in a free market, operating on a global level, with a product 
about which most people have little knowledge. Furthermore, wine as a product of investment 
will often stay in bonded warehouses. Arguably, these are enabling factors, as the fraudsters 
operate outside the industry and those within the industry can distance themselves from fraud 
prevention, citing that it is a generic social problem, rather than one for the industry.  
 
Hines (2001) found that a collective effort of authorities, the wine sector and private investors, 
taking several measures together, could minimise wine fraud. However, he was focused largely 
on substitution and other physical manipulations of wine products. Those industry insiders 
sampled in 2016 for this study regarded wine investment fraud as an external problem, one for 
law enforcement agencies. The question is: what would it take for the industry to take action to 
mitigate cold-calling fraud, through awareness of wine investment fraud, communication, and 
transparency, and by questioning operational processes and internal controls? 
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From 2017 onwards, several firms and agencies have been publishing details of how the wine 
investment industry really works, and how to avoid frauds. This coincides with several actions 
on elderly financial abuse by government agencies in the UK, the USA and elsewhere. We 
postulate that the collective action taken very recently is motivated by the realisation of the 
extent to which the victims of the crime are, largely, elderly.  
 
The policeman and the judge given as examples in our findings probably fell victim due to 
general human bias exemplified through heuristics, for instance, availability (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1973; Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). Victims being socially engineered could possibly 
experience this manipulation of biases even more, as the circumstances and benchmarks used to 
make judgments are consciously manipulated by the fraudster. Some are targeted because they 
are individuals looking for ways to ensure future financial security during or after their 
retirement, as supported by Lokanan´s (2014) study. A factor enabling the growth of the fraud in 
UK was the government’s decision in 2014 to allow pensioners to draw down part of their 
pension early, rather than invest in an annuity, which was the previous legal requirement. 
 
The group that caused the main concernto our interviewees though was people with mental 
disabilities, such as Alzheimer’s or dementia. All our interviewees saw these as one of the main 
targets for investment frauds, although they were unable to go into specific details about the 
transactions taking place either due to confidentiality or the general nature of their knowledge. 
There is a risk of bias in the comments, because participants may have particularly noticed these 
victim stories, and given them more weight than others.  
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In the last few years, elder abuse has become a priority for government and other agencies. There 
are public awareness campaigns in several countries, including the USA. Alongside this, the 
FCA in the UK, and other similar agencies such as the FBI in the US, are trying to ensure that 
the elderly and others are not enticed by alternative investment frauds (Harvey et al., 2014; 
Graham, 2014). These are also recognised as an issue for professionals, one white collar crime 
prosecutor in the USA identifying that “the trusted advisor has an indispensable role in 
protecting investors not only as they plan for retirement, but particularly as they begin to face the 
special challenges and dangers of diminished capacity” (Fleming, 2015). There has been 
recognition of elder financial abuse in North America for over a decade, and several schemes 
have been designed to help counter such abuse (see for example Malks et al., 2008). 
 
What is important for our story of wine investment fraud is that this background discourse has 
begun to mobilise the wine industry into protecting itself. In other words, the barriers we identify 
in Table 6 as reasons for the industry distancing itself from responsibility for action have been to 
some extent overridden. The actions taken recently by the wine industry take the form of public 
education about the previously esoteric and exclusive world of legitimate wine investment, and 
how legitimate businesses would and would not act. We can infer that the risk of being 
associated with wine investment frauds and abuse of the elderly in particular has led to collective 
action from police, government agencies, trade associations and the legitimate wine businesses, 
using traditional and social media as a counter fraud measure. The extent to which the industry is 
acting in self-interest, rather than through altruism, is difficult to assess. However, a further 
project is at the time of writing being conducted by colleagues to assess the motivations for the 
counter fraud measures put in place by the wine investment industry as a response. 
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Using the dimensions of collective action proposed by Pinard (2011) and others, outlined 
previously, we can infer that outrage provided impetus for industry actors to join with police and 
other agencies in collective action. In theoretical terms, discontent with the fraudsters tainting the 
industry (Oberschall, 2004), or the injustice of being implicated in the activity (van Zomeren et 
al., 2008), or a sense of moral obligation (Pinard, 2011), could all create motivation. The 
capacity to organise and a belief that there would be some efficacy in doing so is, especially 
through  the use of social media, websites, radio and television airtime, and press releases,. There 
appears to be a consolidation of social identity as the ‘legitimate’ investment trade against the 
fraudsters  and a sense of political opportunism and self-worth in countering a social evil in the 
form of elder abuse.  
 
Another discovery is that some of the victims do not seem to be able to protect themselves if 
targeted. Increasing security awareness, and coaching and training to enhance knowledge and 
awareness, are suggested proactive measures to avoid victimisation (see for example, Lokanan, 
2014; Drew and Cross, 2013). However, Alves and Wilson (2008) argue that educating those 
targeted by fraudsters may not be effective and argue that prevention should focus on education 
and training to encourage people to report boiler room frauds, in order to fight what they label as 
´financial abuse of the elderly`. This method alone may not be sufficient to prevent its 
occurrence, although Graham (2014) reports that fewer people are paying money to fraudsters 
before calling the authorities (20% in 2014 compared with 60% in around 2010). The efficacy of 
collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2009) for public awareness needs assessing in further work 
in the form of empirical research. 
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The theoretical frameworks for the motivations behind collective action offered by Pinard 
(2011), van Zomeren et al. (2008) and Oberschall (2004), and others, could be explored in 
greater depth, and a more robust conceptual approach developed for the context of financial 
crime. More work is needed to understand the extent to which existence of elder abuse in relation 
to wine investment fraud is the key motivation for collective action. Graham (2014) found that 
victims of wine investment fraud are most likely to be the retired with resources who are also 
‘mature and savvy’. Intuitively, there is less likely to be sympathy with the less infirm elderly 
who make mistakes.Bosley et al. (2018) found something similar in pyramid scheme frauds, 
finding a correlation in: 
 
“victimization beyond cognitive ability, including impulsivity, risk preferences, 
religiosity, and prior exposure to pyramid scheme fraud. Subject reliance on probabilities 
in decision-making and the accuracy of subjective expectations are the most statistically 
significant predictors of the decision to invest…” (see Harvey et al. 2014).  
 
Another inference may be that the legitimate wine investment companies would like retirees 
surplus resources to be invested with them rather than with fraudsters, though the interviews with 
experts from wine businessesuggest that they are motivated to protect the reputation of their own 
trade. 
 
Nearly all the available papers on the subject of collective action in financial crime – 
professional as well as academic – discuss actions against corruption by local and national 
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groups. We suggest that theoretical frameworks of collective action (economic and sociological) 
could be used by researchers in forensic accounting and counter fraud to investigate other areas 
of interest. The first area might involve qualitative research into movements (or lack of social 
movement) against fraud by companies. In the literature, fraud prevention is often only discussed 
in terms of the fraud triangle and improved internal controls by individual companies to protect 
against employee fraud. However, alternative investment scams, company financial statement 
frauds, and the sub-prime mortgage scandals that contributed to the 2008-9 financial crises are 
systemic, social problems. These cannot be adequately explained by the fraud triangle or internal 
control deficits. The second area might involve researching why certain social groups get drawn 
into frauds or financial crime. Baker and Faulkner (2003) examine the diffusion of fraud through 
social networks, and Granovetter’s (1985) work on embeddedness and the role of social 
networks in corrupt communities is a useful starting point for such research. There is also 
potential to look at the issue from the angle of group optimisation and free riding, following 
Olson (1965) and others using quantitative game theory methods. In wine investment fraud, there 
is scope for a much deeper analysis of benefits for the fraudster, the opportunities for realising 
these, and the persistence of the fraud, from both quantitative and qualitative research 
standpoints. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We examined wine investment fraud in the UK through the experiences and perceptions of a 
purposeful sample of experts with oversight of the field. The interviews allowed us to gain an 
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understanding of how wine investment fraud is perpetrated and of the nature of the victims of the 
fraud.  
 
This study is presented as a research note to recognise the constraints of the available data and 
the inferences it is possible to draw from that data. Our theoretical analysis is explanatory and 
based on existing frameworks. The study offers two contributions. First, the expert interviews 
present information about a particular type of fraud drawn from extensive experience and 
identify in part what motivated the wine industry in the UK collectively to put in place counter-
fraud measures. Second, we identify collective action theory as an alternative framework for the 
analysis of counter fraud initiatives by social groups, taking such theory beyond the problem of 
corruption and into the field of financial crimes in capital and commodity markets. The Financial 
Conduct Authority’s work in this field (Graham, 2014; Harvey et al, 2014) could be supported 
further by the evidence from our study. Regulators and investment advisors need to be part of the 
ongoing collective action to educate potential investors and their networks of family and friends 
about the legitimate wine investment trade and the need to avoid online investment scams. 
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